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sued for drivers' examinations 0 still propounds the major rule of
right-hand right of way, with no hint of exceptions.
In the interest of simplicity, certainty, and intelligibility, Ohio's
definition of right of way should be rewritten without the complicat-
ing phrase, and the intersection rule should be augmented by words
to the effect that the driver on the left must yield despite the other
driver's intent to turn or to proceed straight through the intersection.
CHARLES J. CONSIGLIO
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT - DOMICILE IN DIVORCE ACTIONS
The plaintiff and defendant were married in New York in 1953,
and subsequently travelled to Florida on January 8, 1958, where the
defendant engaged in extensive business dealings. On February 5,
the defendant filed a declaration of domicile and citizenship stating
that he had been a bona fide resident of the State of Florida since
January 1, 1958. In April of the same year the plaintiff returned to
New York, and thereafter, on June 4, the defendant, having remained
in Florida, instituted an ultimately successful divorce action in that
state.
In the present action,' the plaintiff sued in New York for separa-
tion, and for a declaration that the defendant's ex parte foreign di-
vorce decree was void on the ground that the defendant did not com-
ply with the Florida statutory requirement of six months' residence.'
In defense, the defendant argued that since he was domiciled in
Florida when the complaint was filed (which fact is undisputed), the
Florida court had jurisdiction to grant a valid divorce, and having
granted a divorce, the New York court could not go behind the
Florida decree and inquire into the length of residence question.
The New York trial court disposed of the defendant's con-
tention that full faith and credit must be given to the Florida
decree by holding that the six months' residency requirement, as in-
terpreted by the Florida courts, is a jurisdictional fact,3 and that,
therefore, there was no jurisdiction over the subject matter unless the
necessary residence were shown. Since an ex parte decree entered
without proof of this fact is void4 and subject to collateral attack in
Florida, and because under the full faith and credit clause of the
United States Constitution,5 a collateral attack is permitted in the
forum when such attack would have been permitted in the rendering
state," the New York court held that it could inquire into the juris-
dictional requisite of residence.
The court decided that since there was no corroborated proof of
10. Oio DEP'T OF HIGHWAY SAFETY, DIGEsT OF MOTOR VEHicLE LAWS 5 (1959).
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the defendant's residence, the Florida court had no jurisdiction over
the subject matter and, therefore, its decree was void and no defense
to this action for separation. 7
This decision is unique because the court held that even though
the defendant was domiciled in the decree rendering state (Florida),
New York was not obligated to grant full faith and credit to the
Florida decision. Such a finding is inconsistent with the weight of
authority which holds that domicile alone is a sufficient requirement
for jurisdiction in divorce actions, and that an ex parte divorce
granted to a plaintiff who has a bona fide domicile in the rendering
state is binding upon the courts of sister states.8
Although domicile is considered the necessary element which con-
fers upon the court the power to exercise jurisdiction over the marital
status (res), the statutes which give particular courts the power to
grant divorces often require that one party must have resided within
the state for a certain period of time before commencing the divorce
action.9 It is normally held that such a stipulation does "not affect
the international requirement for jurisdiction, which is based on
domicile,"' 0 but is an addition to it, and that non-compliance with the
requirement does not render a divorce decree void if the plaintiff had
a bona fide domicile within the state when the suit was commenced."
These courts take the position that the time of residence merely pre-
scribes a condition or fact that the plaintiff must prove to entitle him
to a divorce. However, if he fails to establish this fact the court's
jurisdiction is not affected - the judgment may be erroneous, but it
is not void."
It now becomes apparent that there are two firmly established
1. Camp v. Camp, 189 N.Y.S.2d 561 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
2. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 65.02 (Supp. 1957) states in part that "the complainant must have
resided for six (6) months in the state before the filing of the bill of complaint."
3. Rollins v. Rollins, 155 Fla. 83, 19 So. 2d 562 (1944); Aldrich v. Aldrich, 153 Fla. 856,
16 So. 2d 47 (1943).
4. Chisolm v. Chisolm, 98 Fla. 1196, 125 So. 694 (1929).
5. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State."
6. Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951); Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
7. Camp v. Camp, 189 N.Y.S.2d 561 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
8. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
9. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 65.02 (Supp. 1957).
10. GOODmiCH, CONFLICt OF LAws 404 (3d ed. 1949); accord, RESTATEmmNT, CONFLICT
OF LAws § 110 (1934).
11. See Annot, 2 A.L.R.2d 291 (1948); Hamblin v. Superior Ct., 195 Cal. 364, 233 Pac.
337 (1925).
12. Thurston v. Thurston, 58 Minn. 279, 59 N.W. 1017 (1894), where the court held that
where plaintiff lied as to his length of residence, the court of the rendering state, nevertheless,
had jurisdiction, for such judgment is on the same footing as any other judgment based upon
false testimony; Sleeper v. Sleeper, 129 N. J. Eq. 94, 18 A.2d 1 (1941); Hammond v. Ham-
mond, 45 Wash. 2d 855, 278 P.2d 387 (1954), where an Idaho decree was attacked in Wash-
ington.
19603
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
rules in conflict. If the rule is applied that once domicile is estab-
lished a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, enabling it to
render a valid divorce decree which must be recognized by sister
states, the New York court's decision not to grant full faith and
credit to the Florida decree is clearly erroneous. However, the de-
cision can be supported if the rule is applied that a decree may be at-
tacked collaterally in a sister state, if it can be attacked collaterally
in the rendering state.
The United States Supreme Court has not yet decided whether
constitutional protection would be given to a state requirement other
than, or in addition to, domicile, which is used as a jurisdictional
basis for divorce. 13 It has stated only that domicile is a sufficient
requirement for jurisdiction in divorce cases, because domicile creates
a situation over which the state can exercise control. In Williams v.
North Carolina,14 the Supreme Court upheld a divorce decree ren-
dered in a state which based jurisdiction in divorce actions on domi-
cile. The Court set forth the rule that once it is established that the
plaintiff is domiciled in the rendering state, sister states must grant
full faith and credit to the foreign decree. If this were not so, and
the decrees of states altering the marital status of persons domiciled
therein were not recognized as valid throughout the union, disaster
would clearly result to innocent persons.' 5 One could easily find him-
self in the untenable position of being married in one state and single
in another. However, it has been logically stated that "a husband
without a wife or a wife without a husband is unknown to the law."1
It is clear that the Supreme Court, in expounding this view, placed
great emphasis upon the desire for a rule which would lend finality to
litigation in divorce cases.'7 This goal is not only desirable, but
necessary, if our judicial system is to operate effectively.
It is this writer's opinion that if and when a case testing the valid-
ity of a jurisdictional requirement in addition to domicile comes be-
fore the Supreme Court, the Court will reiterate the view that domi-
cile is the only prerequisite for jurisdiction. The strong dissenting
opinions registered in the second Williams v. North Carolina18 case
seem to support this view. These dissenting opinions declared that
the majority's decision that the jurisdictional fact of domicile may be
inquired into and impeached by sister states, leads to the result that
every ex parte divorce decree is now subject to collateral attack on
the domicile question, which means that one's status after a divorce
13. Snow, Recognition of Sister State Divorce - Its Compulsory Aspect, 25 BROOKLYN L
REV. 278 (1959).
14. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
15. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 301 (1942).
16. Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 (1901).
17. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
18. 325 U.S. 226 (1945). The Supreme Court allowed the Nevada court's finding as to
domicile to be collaterally attacked in a prosecution by a state for bigamy.
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